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[L. A. No. 21714. In Bank. Feb. 7, 1951.]

HENRY RUINELLO, Appellant ~. DOROTHY CLUNE
MURRAY, Respondent.
[11 Frauds. Statute of-Estoppel to Assert.-A party to all oral
contract cannot be estcpped Lo rely 011 the statute of frauds
unless nonenforcement of the contract would result in unjust
enrichment to him, or unconscionablf' injury to the other party.
[2&, 2b] id.-Pleading Matter in Avoidance.-In an action for
damages for breach of an oral employment contract within the
atatute of frauds. an allegation that plaintiff gave up u
"permanent life-time position" to work for defendant, not
coupled with a further allegation of special consideration or
terms to take thl' contract out of the rule that such employment is terminable at the will of either party, does not show
that plaintifi will suffer an unconscionable injury ill leaving
such employment for onl' which is likewise terminable at the
will of either party so as to estop defendant from relying upon
the statute of frauds.
is) Master and Servant-Contracts of EmploJDlent-Duration.Ordinarily a contract for permanent employment, life employment, for so long as the (·mployee chooses, or for other terms
indicating permanent eUIJlIIoyment, is interpreted as a contract
for an indefinite period terminable at the will of either party,
unless it is based on some consideration other than the services
to be rendered.
[4] Frauds. Statute of-Pleading Matter in A~oida.nce.-In an
action for damages for breach c.f an oral employment contract
within the statute of frauds, and for an accounting of the
gross proceeds, in which plaintiff, by the contract, had a percentage bonus interest, an allegation that the gross income
of defendant's building was substantially inereased as a result
of plaintiff's efiorts, not coupled with an allegation tha. the
re8.!!onable value of plaintiff's services was greater than the
salary he was paid while working for defendant, does not
show that defendant will be unjustly enriched if the contract
is not enforced.
See 10 Cal.Jur. 644; 49 Am.Jur. 888.
Uuration of contract purporting to be for permanent emplOYUltlllt, note. S5 A.L.R. 1432. Validity and duration of contract
purporting to be for )t'Tmanent employment, note, 135 A..L.R. 646.
See, also, 16 Cal.Jur. 977; 35 Am.Jur. 460.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Frll.uJ~ Statute of, § 59; [2, 4]
Frauds, Statute of, § 63; L3] Master aI£<1 St:rvant, § 27; [6] Pleadille• § 103,4).
tIl
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[6] Pleading-Demurrer to Complaint-Amendment After Demur·
nr Sustained.-Where three successive amended complaints
have been vnlnerable to demurrer on the same ground, the
eourt may reasonably conclude that the complaint is incapable
of being amended to state 8 cause of action, and does not
abuse its discretion in sustaining a demurrer to the third
amended complaint without leave to amend.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los Angelea County. William B MeKesson. Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful discharge from employ·
ment, and for an accounting Judgment for defendant pur.
suant to order sustaining demurrer to third amended com·
plaint without leave to amend, affirmed.
Seymour D. Sommer for Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Frederic H. Sturdy and John 1':'
Pigott, Jr., for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer to his third amended com·
plaint was sustained without leave to amend.
Plaintiff aUeges that in October, 1945. he and defendant
entered into an oral agreement whereby in consideratioll of plaintiff's giving up 8 "permanent life-time position" with
another employer as engineer and superintendent of the 834
South Broadway Building and taking a similar position with
defendant, the owner of the Ninth and Broadway Buildin~
in Los Angeles, for the term of five years, defendant would
pay plaintiff a monthly salary of $350 plus 8 yearly bonus
of 20 per cent of the gross income in excess of $114.000; that
plaintiff had been continuously employed as engineer and
superintendent of the 834 South Broadway Buildin~ since
its erection in 1926 until October, 1945. wht'n he resigned to
enter the employ of deft'ndant; that plaintiff was persollally
acquainted with defendant for 20 years and had been previ.
ously employed by defendant's deceased husband and by
defendant, who were lessees of 834 South Broadway Building
from 1933 to 1943; that plaintiff was employt'd by defendant
from December 1, 1945. to February 21, 1948. when defendant
summarily discharged him to avoid paymt'nt of thf' bonus;
that durin~ tht' pt'riod plaintiff work I'd for dpft'lldllllt he was
able to incrt:ase the lUWual groSli .income of the building to
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approximately $263,000. Plaintiff seeks recovery of $11,050,
the sum he would have been entitled to receive as Ilalary
during the remainder of the employment agreement. Be also
prays for an accounting of the gross profits and for judgmeut
for 20 per cent of the yearly gross profits in excess of $114.000.
Defendant demurred to plaintiff's original complaint on
tbe ground that the oral agreement, admittedly not to be
performed within one year, was within the statute of frauds.
(Civ. Code, § 16240); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(1).) The
trial court sustained the demurrer to the original complaint
as well as the demurrE'r to thE' amenliE'd complaint. Plaintiff,
by stipulation. folJoWE'd hll~ sE'cond amended complaint with
a third amended complaint to whIch a demurrer was sustained
without leave to amend.
[l)PJaintifi' contE'nd" that he bas alleged sufficient facts
to estop defendant from TE'lying on the statute of frauds.
There can be no E'stoppel nnless plaintiff will su1fer on·
conscionable injury or dE'fE'nollnt will be unjustly enriched
if thE' oral contract. -is not E'llforced. (Monarco v. LoOreco,
35 Cal.2d 621. 623·624 1220 P .2d 737) and cases there cited.)
Plaintiff bas not alleged facts that meet either of these
conditions.
[2a) To stat.e a ~ause of action based on unconscionable
injury it is not enougb to allege that plaintiff gave up
existing employment to work for defendant. (Murdock v.
Swanson, 85 Cal.App.2d 380. 385 [193 P.2d 81]; 8tafKUng v.
Morosco, 43 Cal.App_ 244. 248 [184 P. 954].) Be must set
forth his rights under the contract given up and show that
they were so valuable that unconscionable injury would result
from refusing to enforcE' the oral contract with defendant
(See, e.g. Seymour v. Oelnr.hs, 156 Cal. 782, 792 [106 P. 88,
134 Am.St.Rep. 154]. Tuck v. O"dnason, 11 Cal.App.2d
626,627.628 [54 P.2d 88J ; cf. Wilk v. VinciU, 30 Cal.2d 104,
105-107 [180 P.20 351].) Plaintiff alleges that he resigned
8 "permanent life·timt' pORition" under an oral contract
witb another employer to enter defendant'. employ. This
allegation does not show tbat plaintiff will sufter an uneonRcionable injury if the oral contraet with defendant is
not enforced. [3) Ordinarily a contract for permanent
employment. for life emploympnt. for so long as the employee
chooses, or for other terms indicating prrmanent employment,
is interprt'teo 8R a contract for an initpnnite period terminable
at the will of either party, unless it is bruocd on some considera-
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tion other than the services to be rendered. (Speegle v.
of Fire Underwriters,29 Cal.2d 34, 39 [172 P.2d 867] ;
v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 601·603 [22 P. 1126,15 Am.
82] I Shuler v. Corl, 39 Cal.App. 195, 197·198 [178 P. 535] ;
cases collected in 35 A.L.R. 1432; 135 A.L.R. 646.) (2b]
plaintiff has not alleged such consideration or other
indicating a contrary intention, it cannot be concluded
the employment he gave up was not at the will of either pa
The leaving of such employment for employment with
fendant that is also terminable at the will ot either party .
because of the statute of frauds does not result in unconscion·
able injury. (Murdock v. Swanson, supra; Standing v. Mo·
rosco, supra.)
[4] Nor are there allegations of facts showing that defendlIut wil1 be unjustly enriched if the contract is not enforced.
Although plaintiff alleges that the gross income of defendant's
building was substantially increased as a result of his efforts, .
he does not· allege that the reasonable value of his services
was greater than the $350 a month he was paid while workmg
for defendant. No unjust enrichment results when the promi- . .
see has received the reasonable value of his services. If
the salary he received under the oral contract was not
equivalent of the reasonable value of his services, an action in
quantum meruit for that value would prevent any unjust
enrichment of defendant. (See Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35
2d 621, 625 [220 P.2d 737]; Long v. Rumsey,12 Cal.2d 334,
342 [84 P.2d 146]; Restatement, Contracts, § 355, TIlustration 1.)
.
(IS] Although the deficiencies in plaintiff's complaints
were raised in defendant's demurrers, after three attempts
he bas not overcome them. The trial court could reasonably
I'onclude that he was unable to do so, and accordingly, it did
f10t abuse its discretion in sustaining the demurrer to the third
~l'llPl1ded complaint without leave to amend. (Wing v. Forest
I awn Cemetery Assn., 15 Cal.2d 472, 485 [101 P.2d 1099,
130 A.L.R. 120] ; Dukes v. Kellogg, 127 Cal. 563, 565 [60 P.
441; Werner v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 65 Cal.App.2d
667. 673 [151 P.2d 308]; Thayer v. Magill, 13 Cal.App.2d
2].27 [55 P.2d 1272]; Whittemore v. Davis, 112 Cal.App. 702,
708-709 [297 P. 640].)
The judgment is affirmed.

)

Gibson, C.•1.. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
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CARTER, J., Dissenting.-In my opinion the complaint
sets forth circumstances showing that plaintiff will suf'Ier
an unconscionable injury if the oral contract with defendant
is not enforced. It is alleged that plaintiff had been continuously employed as engineer and superintendent of the
834 South Broadway Building in the city of Los Angeles
from the time it was erected in 1926 until October 14, 1945;
that at the latter date plaintiff was employed under an oral
agreement with the owner of the building, Aaron Weinrallb,
whereby plaintiff had a permanent lifetime job; that plaintiff
resigned this position at the request of defendant and in
reliance upon an oral agreement with defendant; that the
latter agreement provided that defendant would pay plaintiff
a monthly salary and a yearly bonus in consideration of
plaintiff's giving up his position with Weinraub and taking
a similar position with defendant, the owner of the Ninth
and Broadway Building, for a term of five years; that plaintiff
took over his duties as superintendent and engineer of the
defendant's building on December 1, 1945, and performed
such duties until February 21, 1948, when defendant discharged plaintiff without cause to avoid the payment of the
bonus to which plaintiff was entitled.
The holding of the majority that the foregoing allegations
do not state facts which estop defendant from relying upon
the statute of frauds is based upon the proposition that a
"permanent lifetime position" ordinarily means merely an
employment for an indefinite period which is terminable at
the will of either pa:r:ty and Murdock v. Swanson, 85 Cal.App.
2d 380 [193 P.2d 81}, and Standing v. Morosco, 43 Ca1.App.
244 [184 P. 954]. are cited as authority for the conclusion
that "The leaving of such employment for employment with
defendant that is also terminable at the will of either party
because of the statute of frauds does not result in unconscionable injury. "
The complaint in the Standing case alleged that the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, gave up his employment and
sold his home and furniture in New York and moved to Los
Angeles in order to enter the defendant's employ in the latter
city. The decision that a cause of action based upon an unconscionable injury had not been stated appears to have been
based upon an erroneous conception of the proper constru<.'tion
of the pleadings. (See Cod!> Civ. Proc.. § 452; Speegle v.
Board of Fire Underwriters. 29 Ca1.2d 34,42 [172 P.2d 867] ;
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Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 542 [145 P.2d 805].) From

)

the premise that •• Assuming against the pleader, as we must,
a~l facts reasonably consistent with the facts alleged, but adverse to the plaintiff," (43 Cal.App. at 248) the court concluded that no serious detriment to the plaintiff would result
from its refusal to enforce the contract with the defendant.
It was surmised that perhaps the plaintiff had sold his
property in New York at a profit and that possibly he p~";
ferred to live among the ranks of the unemployed in Los '
Angeles. Directly contrary to that decision on substantially i
similar facts is Kaye v. Melzer, 87 Cal.App.2d 299 [197 P.2d
60J.
Even if it be assumed that the result reached in the Standing
case was proper on the ground that sufficient facts had not
been set forth with regard to the New York employment
which had been given up, the complaint in the present case is
not deficient in that respect. As stated above, plaintiff alleged
that he had been continuously employed for 19 years in his
previous position with the 834 South Broadway Building and
that this employment was to continue at least indefinitely.
Murdock v. Swanson, mpra, was an action upon an oral
____ .. ... contract..tomake a will. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff had sold her business in order to devote her time to
performing services for the decedent. In holding that facts .
were noi alleged which indicated that a serious change
position had taken place, it was said that the alle~ation with
regard to the plaintiff having sold her business was insufficient because it was not asserted that the decedent requested
or knew of the sale. (But see Wilk v. Vencill, 80 Cal.2d 104,
108 [180 P .2d 851), where this requirement is repudiated;
see, also, Tuck v. Gudnason, 11 Cal.App.2d 626 [54 P.2d 88].)
Again, even if the Murdock case merits approval on its facts,
it furnishes no precedent for the present case. It is alleged
here in considerable detail that plaintiff gave up his prior
employment at the request of defendant.
The fact that plaintiff's employment agreement with Weinraub may have been terminable at will does not compel the
conclusion that he will not suffer serious detriment if his
contract with defendant is not enforced. In the first place,
it is, I submit, a matter of common knowledge that one who
has heen employed in the same position for a number of years
has performed satisfactory services, enjoys the good will of
hil'l employer, and will not ordinarily be discharged without·
good cause. In this respect plaintiff's change of position waa

of

Feb. 1951]

RUINELLO fl. MURRAY
[18 C.1d 88'l;

m

P.JcI 1111]

693

not materially dUIerent from that involved in 8,,,mour T.
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782 [106 P. 88,184 Am.St.Rep.154]. While
plaintiff's rights under his contract of employment with
Weinraub may not have been as definitely defined as those
fixed by the former contract of the plaintiff in the Seymour
case, yet in a very real sense plaintiff has given up substantially
the same thing.
The decisions holding that an action to recover damages
may be predicated upon an intentional and unjustifiable
interference with a contract terminable at will (Speegle v.
Boardo! Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d 34, 39-40, and
cases cited; Romano v. Wilbur Ellis & Co., 82 Ca1.App.2d 670,
673 [186 P.2d 1012] ; see Prosser, Torts, pp. 981·982) indicate
that the loss of such a contract does involve a serious detriment. Particularly is this true with respect to employment
contracts-the means by which the great majority of people
earn a living. Thus, the severe individual hardships resulting
from unemployment and the national problems thereby cre·
ated were recognized by Congress in enacting the Social
Security Act of 1935. (Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 586-587 [57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R.
1293].) That the giving up of employment of long duration,
as is here alleged, is n~t a matter of great importance to the
employee, and a serious change of position on his part, is,
in my opinion, a highly unrealistic conclusion.
The majority opinion cites Wilk v. Veneill, 30 Cal.2d 104
[180 P.2d 351], as an example of the showing necessary to
establish an estoppel to rely upon the statute of frauds. The
only substantial cham'.!' of position there was that the plaintiff
gave up an opportunity to purchase another house in the
neighborhood in reliance upon the defendant wife's oral
consent to an agreement to sel1 the defendants' house to the
plaintiff, it being al1eged that there were no other houses
available in the vicinity. If such a comparatively slight inconvenience or the mere loss of a desirable opportunity, rather
than the termination of an agreement relating to one's very
means of livelihood, is the proper test of unconscionable in·
jury, then plaintiff has also brought himself within that rule.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff informed defendant in
September, 1945, that he planned to remain on his job at the
834 South Broadway Building for another five years, at which
time he expected to retire; "that the defendant then stated
to the plaintiff that if he desired to work for five years only
that would be agreeable to her and that if he would accept the

)
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position (with defendant) they could both retire at the end
five years." From the additional allegations that
resigned his position with Weinraub and accepted d" .. c ... u.<lUL
offer and that plaintiff was discharged by defendant in l"elnr11I..-~31!!1
ary, 1948, it is evident that Ruinello's pian to retire in
has been frustrated if the oral contract with defendant
not to be enforced, just as the desire of the plaintiff WUk
acquire a home in one neighborhood would have been
trated if his ora) agreement had not been enforced.
._
In my opinion the change of position alleged here is at
least as serious as those involved in Wilk v. Vencm, su 1Wa.,·:'.l·. ·
Vierra v. Pereira, 12 Ca1.2d 629 [86 P.2d 816J, Wt'lson V."',
Bailey, 8 Ca1.2d 416 [65 P.2d 770], Frey v. Corbin, 84 Cal.':
App.2d 536 [191 P.2d 21], Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. 8ere8, '
76 Cal.App.2d 255 [172 P.2d 894], and Holstrom v. Mullen,]
84 Cal.App. 1 [257 P. 545].
~
I would, therefore, reverse the j u d g m e n t . " ' "
-/

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 8, ,
1951. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
..~
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